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This paper examines the cyclical properties of employment rates in a search and
matching model that features heterogeneous workers and jobs. I capture heterogeneity
by postulating two skill levels: high and low. All low-skill workers can produce in only
low-skill jobs, whereas some high-skill workers can produce in both high-and low-skill
jobs. My analysis highlights the importance of a vertical type of transitory skill mis-
match, in which workers accept jobs below their skill level to escape unemployment
and upgrade by on-the-job search, in explaining why employment is typically lower and
more procyclical at lower skill levels. The model is also consistent with other important
features of the labor market, such as a procyclical rate of job-to-job transitions and evi-
dence on cyclical changes in the composition of job quality. In recessions outows from
unemployment shift the distribution of high-skill workers toward low-skill jobs, while
expansions allow them to upgrade to high-skill jobs through job-to-job transitions.
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11 Introduction
Considerable recent research has focused on the question of how well the search and
matching model performs in explaining the cyclical properties of central labor market vari-
ables, such as the job nding and unemployment rate.1 However, by focusing only on
homogeneous-agent frameworks, no commensurate attention has been paid to the question
of how well the matching model performs in explaining the observed salient dierences in the
levels and cyclical patterns of employment of dierent skill groups. As shown in Figure 1,
the high-school employment rate is lower and more volatile than is the college employment
rate. The standard deviation of log deviations from trend of the former is 0.0115 with log
deviations ranging from -0.0342 to 0.0164; while for the latter, it is only 0.0046 and its log
deviations range from -0.0103 to 0.0068.
In this paper, I adapt an extension of the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model to study
the cyclicality of vacancies and employment by skill group. The model allows for worker and
rm heterogeneity by postulating two skill levels: high and low. All low-skill workers can
produce in only low-skill jobs, whereas some high-skill workers can produce in both high-and
low-skill jobs. The latter are skill mismatched for low-skill jobs, because they produce less
output in such jobs than they produce in high-skill jobs. However, if they do encounter a
low-skill job, they have the option to accept it and to keep searching for a high-skill job while
they are employed.
The model is guided by a number of observations that suggest that skilled individuals are
less prone to unemployment because they take less-skilled jobs while searching for other jobs.
Nickell (1979) was the rst to propose this as a possible explanation for the typically lower
and less countercyclical skilled unemployment rate, but other studies since then have given
empirical support for this view. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) show that the propensity
to search while on the job is higher among the more educated. Evidence by Polsky (1999) and
more recently by Nagyp al (2008) shows that the percentage of job separations accounted for
by \quits"(resignations) that are followed by a direct transition into a new job is higher when
there is a higher education level. Devereux (2002, 2004) nds that when the unemployment
rate is high, the educational levels of new hires within occupations are higher and that
this eect is more pronounced in less-skilled occupations. Expansions are associated with
1See, for example, Shimer (2005b), Hall (2005a), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Costain and Reiter
(2008), Pries (2008), and Pissarides (2009).
2workers upgrading occupations through job-to-job transitions. The role of on-the-job search
in facilitating the reallocation of workers has been emphasized in Barlevy (2002), who cites
evidence by Bowlus (1995) and Davis et al. (1996) that jobs created in recessions are of
lower quality and pay.
I calibrate the model to the U.S. labor market, with high-skill labor representing college
graduates and low-skill labor representing high-school educated workers. I show that the
model can explain both the levels and the relative volatility of the two employment rates.
As is shown in the data, the standard deviation of log deviations from trend of the college
employment rate is more than twice that of the high-school employment rate. However,
without allowing for college graduates temporarily taking \high-school" (low-skill) level jobs,
the model fails to account for these facts. In particular, it yields a college employment rate
that is lower than what is observed and that is excessively volatile relative to the high-school
employment rate. The model is also consistent with the evidence on cyclical changes in
the composition of job quality mentioned above. When the unemployment rate is high,
the share of high-school level jobs occupied by college graduates is higher. In line with
well-established evidence by Shimer (2005a) and others, the model generates procyclical job-
to-job ows. Consequently, in recessions outows from unemployment shift the distribution
of college graduates toward high-school (high-school level) jobs, while expansions allow them
to upgrade to college (college level) jobs through job-to-job transitions.2
In Section 2, I set out the structure of the model. In Section 3, I discuss the impact of
skill mismatches on rms' vacancy-posting incentives. There are two channels through which
skill mismatches can strengthen incentives for rms to open low-skill vacancies in booms.
The rst relates to the expected duration of jobs: the shorter a job is expected to last, the
greater the benet from creating that job in a boom than in a recession. Consequently,
when rms anticipate that low-skill jobs will be shorter on average due to some workers
quitting to take high-skill jobs, they have a stronger incentive to create these jobs in booms.
The second relates to the net productivity (i.e., the dierence between the worker's output
and unemployment income) of skill-mismatched, high-skill workers. An increase in aggre-
gate productivity has a larger impact (in percentage terms) on the value of an employment
match if the net productivity of that match is small. Consequently, the impact of a positive
2Whenever I refer to \high-school jobs" I mean the jobs that require at least a high-school diploma and
whenever I refer to \college jobs" I mean the jobs the require at least a college degree.
3productivity shock on rms' expected prots from low-skill vacancy postings is larger when
the output of high-skill workers in low-skill jobs is close to their unemployment income, and
rms anticipate that it is likely that low-skill vacancies will be occupied by high-skill workers.
By contrast, incentives to post high-skill vacancies in booms become weaker when high-skill
workers can transitorily take low-skill jobs. The increase in the value of on-the-job search
that occurs in a boom is larger than the increase in the value of unemployed search, because
on-the-job searchers earn a wage that reects aggregate economic conditions, while unem-
ployment income is xed. Consequently, when high-skill workers can search for high-skill
jobs while holding low-skill jobs, the improvement in their outside option, and thus in their
bargaining power, during cyclical upturns is larger. This makes a boom a less-good time for
a rm to post a high-skill vacancy.
In order to quantify the model's implications, in Section 4 I calibrate and simulate
the model numerically. I rst assume that all unemployed college graduates would take a
high-school job and would search on the job for a college job. I show that in this case the
model yields a college overeducation rate that ranges from 10% to 17% and that matches the
levels and the cyclical behavior of employment rates well. I then examine how the model's
predictions change when the proportion of college graduates that are willing to transitorily
take high-school jobs is smaller. In line with the intuition mentioned above, the simulations
show that allowing for a larger share of college graduates to transitorily take high-school
jobs not only lowers the college employment rate, but also contributes to making the posting
of high-school vacancies more procyclical than the posting of college vacancies; this helps
explain the relative volatility of the employment rates.
The closest precursors of the model analyzed in this paper are the contributions by
Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002), and Dolado et al. (2009). These studies
use a denition of skills similar to the one used in this paper. However, they focus on
explaining uneven developments, in the longrun, in the unemployment rates of dierent skill
groups. Thus, they look only at steady-state equilibria. Note that allowing for two-sided skill
heterogeneity and on-the-job search complicates the stochastic equilibrium characterization
to a great extent. This is because the distribution of workers across jobs is entered into
the model as a state variable, in a complicated nonmonotonic way. This might be one of
the reasons existing studies that consider frameworks featuring some sort of heterogeneity
and on-the-job search often restrict their analysis to nonstochastic equilibrium, while most
4of those that allow for aggregate uncertainty consider simplied frameworks where there is
a unique matching rate for all labor and job types.3 Hence, they characterize the cyclical
behavior of labor ows only in terms of average values. More fundamentally, they overlook
the across-skill congestion eects and externalities that arise when workers of dierent skill
levels compete for the same types of jobs.
The paper by Khalifa (2010), written contemporaneously with my paper, is an exception.
He also develops a stochastic model with search frictions and two-sided skill heterogeneity,
but has a dierent objective. He attempts to explain the persistence of unemployment.
Moreover, in Khalifa's model, workers can direct their search toward specic vacancy types,
whereas in my model search is random. He argues that a possible explanation to the persis-
tence of unemployment is the crowding out of unskilled workers into unemployment caused
by intensied competition from skilled workers for unskilled jobs during cyclical downturns.
This crowding out eect is a dominant feature in Khalifa's model, because he makes the
critical, but questionable, assumption that rms can create unskilled vacancies that are
exclusively directed to the skilled workers. During downturns a higher share of unskilled
vacancies are directed toward the skilled workers, leading to higher unemployment among
the unskilled workers who are suited for only unskilled jobs. His model can explain un-
employment persistence, but cannot reproduce the procyclicality of the skilled employment
rate, because the increase in the employment of skilled workers in unskilled jobs that occurs
in downturns exceeds the reduction in their employment in skilled jobs.
3Examples are Barlevy (2002), Krause and Lubik (2006) and Nagyp al (2007) who study cyclical dynamics
in matching models that feature on-the-job search. Krause and Lubik assume that labor is homogeneous and
there are only high-and low-wage jobs, while Barlevy's model accounts for both worker and rm heterogeneity,
but focuses only on symmetric equilibria where there is a common job nding/lling rate for all worker/rm
types. In Nagyp al, both workers and jobs are homogeneous and on-the-job search is motivated by subjective
perceptions of job quality by workers. Nagyp al restricts the analysis to nonstochastic equilibria. Moreover,
Nagyp al uses a simple sharing rule for wage setting that makes her model more tractable, but has the
considerable disadvantage that wages do not reect the impact of on-the-job search. The same sharing rule
is also used by Barlevy (2002). Pries (2008) also explores cyclical dynamics, but considers a model with
only one type of job that can be occupied by either high-or low-productivity workers, and no motivation for
on-the-job search.
52 The model
The framework consists of an economy where time is innite and discrete. The popu-
lation is of measure 1, and there is a continuum of rms. All agents are risk neutral and
discount the future at rate r. Each rm has the choice of opening a vacancy that requires
either a high or a low skill level. Jobs and rms are indexed by j = [h;l], where h refers to
high-skill jobs and l to low-skill jobs. A fraction  of workers have a low-skill level and the
remaining 1    have a high-skill level. Low-skill workers can produce only in low-skill jobs.
A fraction  of high-skill workers can produce in both high- and low-skill jobs, whereas the
remaining 1  can produce only in high-skill jobs. Workers are indexed by i = [h; h;l]. The
subscript h refers to the high-skill workers that can produce in both types of jobs, the sub-
script  h to the high-skill workers that can produce only in high-skill jobs and the subscript
l to the low-skill workers.
Firms are free to enter the market to create employment matches by posting a vacancy
(either high-or low-skill) at ow cost cj in order to recruit a worker. If the rm succeeds
in recruiting a worker, the ow output of the resulting employment match is the product of
a stochastic aggregate component, y, and a match specic component, ij. The aggregate
productivity component follows a discrete-state Markov process, with a vector of realizations
 y and a transition matrix  with elements nm = probfy0 =  ym n y =  yng. Both types of
high-skill workers are equally productive in high-skill jobs. That is,  hh = hh. A type-h
worker matched with a low-skill job is skill mismatched, because he generates lower output
than when matched with a high-skill job, i.e., hh > hl. An employment match can be
destroyed either for exogenous reasons or due to the worker quitting to take another job as
a consequence of on-the-job search. I allow the exogenous separation rates for the two types
of jobs, sj, to dier, and set sl  sh.4 Whenever a job is exogenously destroyed, the worker
becomes unemployed and begins searching for a new job. While unemployed, the worker
receives an unemployment income bi, which can be interpreted as the ow opportunity cost
associated with working. I assume that the unemployment income is the same for both types
of high-skill workers, i.e., b h = bh.
The rms have no way of signaling the type of vacancies to the workers before the
workers search for them. Thus, the job searchers apply randomly to jobs, meaning that they
4This assumption is based on the observation that the duration of less-skilled jobs is typically shorter
than the duration of more-skilled jobs. See, for example, Abraham and Farber (1987).
6sometime apply for jobs they are not (best) suited for. An unemployed type-i worker is
willing to accept any job that oers a wage that is higher than bi. Even if that is not the
job he is best suited for, he is better o accepting it, because he can move to a better job
through on-the-job search.5 Below I show that the wage of a type-i worker in a type-j job
is always higher than bi, if yij > bi for all y   y. This condition also ensures that the rm is
also better o hiring the worker, instead of keeping the job vacant. Since type-l and type-h
workers are not suited for high-and low-skill jobs, respectively, this condition is violated for
these two types of matches, but holds for all of the rest of the match types. That is, for all
y   y,
yhh > bh; yhl > bh; yll > bl; ylh  bl y hl  bh (1)
The payo structure is therefore such that if a type-h worker comes across a low-skill
job, she accepts it, if unemployed, and searches on the job for a high-skill job. She stays in
the low-skill job until either she quits to accept a high-skill job or an exogenous separation
occurs that moves her into unemployment. If the job she nds is high-skill, she accepts it,
regardless of being employed or unemployed, and stays in it until the job is destroyed for
exogenous reasons. A type- h (type-l) worker who nds a high-skill (low-skill) job accepts it
and stays in it until an exogenous separation occurs, but if the job found is low-skill (high-
skill), the worker continues searching until a high-skill (low-skill) job comes along. Type- h
and type-l workers have no incentive to search on the job, because all jobs of the same type
are identical.
2.1 Matching
A single matching market with a matching function determines the number of contacts
between searching rms and workers as a function of total number of vacancies, , and the
total number of job seekers, z. The total number of vacancies is given by  = l + h: the
number of low- plus the number of high-skill vacancies. The total number of job seekers is
given by z = uh+u h+ul+"hl: the number of unemployed high- and low-skill workers, uh;u h
and ul, plus the number of on-the-job searchers, "hl. The function m(;z) is homogeneous
of degree one and increasing and concave in both its arguments. This allows me to write
5I assume for convenience that employed search is as ecient as unemployed search, meaning that the
arrival rate of future job oers is the same for both employed and unemployed searchers. It follows that the
only opportunity cost associated with skill mismatches is the unemployment income, bh.
7the number of contacts per job seeker as m() and the number of contacts per vacancy as
q() = m(1; 1
), where  = 
z measures the tightness of the labor market. A job seeker
contacts a low-skill vacancy at rate m() and a high-skill vacancy at rate m()(1   ),
where  =
l
 . Likewise, a rm nds a type-h unemployed worker at rate q()(
uh
z ); a type- h
unemployed worker at rate q()(
u h
z ); a high-skill worker who is already employed at rate
q()(
"hl
z ); and a low-skill (unemployed) worker at rate q()(
ul
z ).
Aside from the standard \congestion" eects embedded in the random matching as-
sumption (i.e., the assumption that job seekers are unable to self-select prior to applying for
a job), the existence of skill-heterogeneity implies additional across-skill congestion eects.
For instance, if job vacancies that come on the market are more high skill, the chances that
a low-skill worker will nd a job are reduced. Likewise, an increase in the share of low-
skill workers in the pool of job seekers lowers the matching rate of high-skill rms. This
choice of modeling the matching process is guided by the observation that what is often
burdensome for rms is not the task of locating applicants, but the task of sifting through
applicants searching for the one that best ts their vacancy. For instance, van Ours and
Ridder (1993) nd that vacancy durations are mainly selection periods, and that attracting
a pool of applicants takes relatively little time. Moreover, if job seekers could eectively
direct their searches toward only the jobs they are best suited for, then vacancies attracting
higher numbers of applicants should be of shorter duration. But, evidence suggests that this
is not always true. Van Ours and Ridder (1992) and Barron, Berger and Black (1997) show
that although the number of applicants per job oer is higher for skilled positions, vacancy
duration is higher for these positions.
Several other studies also make the random matching assumption in search models that
feature skill heterogeneity.6 Gautier et al. (2010) argue that allowing for skill heterogeneity in
a model in which matching is random is relevant; one of the most important reasons for search
is to nd the right person for the job. They also argue, by citing evidence that job-to-job
ows are a salient labor-market feature, for the existence of information frictions that prevent
workers from immediately matching with their optimal job type.7 Acemoglu (1999) argues
6Plesca (2010) calibrates a model with a similar setup as the model in this paper in order to investigate
the properties of random versus directed search, in the context of the Employment Service.
7Nagyp al (2008) shows that in the U.S. the rate of job-to-job transitions is twice as large as employment-
to-unemployment transition rate. Moreover, Blanchard and Diamond (1989a) show that, on average, hires
from other jobs are about 50% of hires from unemployment.
8for the plausibility of random matching in an environment with skill heterogeneity - pointing
out that it is dicult for rms to target recruiting exclusively to workers with a particular
skill level, because skill is imperfectly correlated with observable characteristics. Pries (2008)
argues in addition that although rms may be able to identify a worker's productivity once
the worker is interviewed by the rm - as assumed in the context of random matching - what
matters regarding the feasibility of directed search is whether a worker's productivity can be
accurately identied prior to meetings, which is less likely.8
2.2 Timing and ow equations
The timing within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period aggregate
productivity is revealed and agents produce. Subsequently, some of the existing matches are
destroyed due to exogenous reasons. Firms post vacancies and search takes place. Some of
the skill-mismatched workers that survived the exogenous separation will quit their low-skill
jobs to take high-skill jobs and some unemployed workers will nd jobs.
Let e = fell;elh;ehh;e hhg denote the distribution of employed workers across types of




ll = "ll + pl(x)[   "ll]
e
0
hh = "hh + ph(x)[(1   )   "hh]
e
0
 hh = " hh + ph(x)[(1   )(1   )   " hh]
e
0
hl = "hl + pl(x)[(1   )   "hl   "hh]   ph(x)"hl (2)
where pl(x) = m((x))(x) and ph(x) = m((x))(1   (x)) are the probabilities of nding
a high- and low-skill job, respectively, and "ij = eij(1   sj), gives the number of jobs that
survived exogenous separations. Since the share of each type of worker in the labor force is
constant and the labor force is normalized to 1, we can write: uh = (1   )   "hh   "hl,
uh = (1 )(1 ) " hh and ul =  "ll. The total number of high-skill job seekers is given
by uh+u h+"hl = 1  "hh " hh: I label the low-skill employment rate as ~ "l =
"ll
 , and the
8What also matters is whether rms can eectively prevent being contacted by job seekers who are not
well suited. Even if rms target recruiting exclusively to workers with a particular skill level, this may still
not prevent unsuited job seekers from applying, especially since the cost of sending one application out is
trivial relative to the cost of losing an employment opportunity.
9overall high-skill employment rate as ~ "h =
"hh+" hh+"hl









To derive the conditions for job entry and the optimality of job search strategies, the
value functions associated with rms and workers, matched and unmatched, need rst to be
specied. I denote the value of unemployment by Ui; the value of employment by Wij; the
value of a vacant job by Vj; and the value of a lled job by Jij.
The value functions for unemployed workers are given by:
Ul(x) = bl + Ex0jx [pl(x)Wll(x
0) + (1   pl(x))Ul(x
0)] (3)
U h(x) = bh + Ex0jx [ph(x)W hh(x
0) + (1   ph(x))U h(x
0)] (4)
Uh(x) = bh + Ex0jx [pl(x)Whl(x
0) + ph(x)Whh(x
0)]
+Ex0jx [(1   pl(x)   ph(x))Uh(x
0)] (5)
where Ex0jx is the expectation operator and  = 1
1+r is the discount factor. The expected
payos in the brackets depend on the transition matrix of aggregate productivity , and the
ow equations described in (2).
The value functions for employed workers satisfy:
Wll(x) = wll(x) + Ex0jx [slUl(x
0) + (1   sl)Wll(x
0)] (6)
Whh(x) = whh(x) + Ex0jx [shUh(x
0) + (1   sh)Whh(x
0)] (7)
W hh(x) = w hh(x) + Ex0jx [shUh(x
0) + (1   sh)W hh(x
0)] (8)
Whl(x) = whl(x) + Ex0jx [slUh(x
0) + (1   sl)Whl(x
0)]
+Ex0jx [(1   sl)ph(x)(Whh(x
0)   Whl(x
0))] (9)
The interpretation of the value functions is straightforward. In (3) and (4), the payo in the
current period for an unemployed type-i worker is bi. With probability pj(x), search results
in a match, yielding an employment value Wij(x0) and with probability 1 pj(x) there is no
match and the continuation value is Ui(x0). In (5), search results in a match with a high-
skill job with probability ph(x) or with a low-skill job with probability pl(x). The resulting
employment values are Whh(x0) and Whl(x0), respectively. In (6)-(8) the employed worker
earns the wage wij(x), keeps the job in the next period with a probability 1   sj and loses
10it with probability sj. For a skill-mismatched worker, the value given by (9), incorporates
in addition the expected payo from on-the-job search. This is given by the last term in the
bracket. With probability (1   sl)ph(x) the worker survives the exogenous separation and
matches with a high-skill job, thereby generating a surplus Whh(x0) Whl(x0) from switching
jobs.
A similar interpretation applies to the value functions for rms. The values of lled jobs
are given by,
Jll(x) = yll   wll(x) + Ex0jx [slVl(x
0) + (1   sl)Jll(x
0)] (10)
Jhh(x) = yhh   whh(x) + Ex0jx [shVh(x
0) + (1   sh)Jhh(x
0)] (11)
J hh(x) = yhh   w hh(x) + Ex0jx [shVh(x
0) + (1   sh)J hh(x
0)] (12)
Jhl(x) = yhl   whl(x) + Ex0jx [slVl(x
0) + (1   sl)Jhl(x
0)]
 Ex0jx [(1   sl)ph(x)(Jhl(x
0)   Vl(x
0))] (13)
and the values of vacancies by:
Vh(x) =  ch + Ex0jx [qh(x)Jhh(x
0) + q h(x)J hh(x
0)]
+Ex0jx [(1   qh(x)   q h(x))Vh(x
0)] (14)
Vl(x) =  cl + Ex0jx [ql(x)Jll(x
0) + qh(x)'(x)Jhl(x
0)]
+Ex0jx [(1   ql(x)   qh(x)'(x))Vl(x
0)] (15)
where qh(x) = q((x))
uh+"hl
z , q h(x) = q((x))
u h
z , ql(x) = q((x))
ul




Shimer (2006) shows that the standard Nash bargaining solution in matching models
without on-the-job search is not valid in models that feature on-the-job search. In particular,
Shimer demonstrates that rms may nd it protable to pay a higher wage in order to
reduce the probability of a quit.9 Allowing for such a feature would complicate the model
considerably. For this reason, I follow Pissarides (1994) and Dolado et al. (2009) in adopting
simplifying assumptions that allow the use of a wage setting rule that looks identical to the
typical Nash bargaining rule.
9Nash bargaining is not valid because the bargaining set is no longer convex when there is on-the-job
search. See also, Gautier et al. (2010).
11Wages are such that a share  of the ow surplus of the match goes to the worker and
the rest goes to the rm. The possibility of long-term contracts is ruled out by assuming that
wages can be continuously revised at no cost. A worker could therefore start negotiating with
a new employer before quitting the current job, but this would not aect the equilibrium
wage, because the new employer would immediately renegotiate the wage once the worker
quits the previous job. This assumption also eliminates the scope for equilibria where low-
skill rms are matching the oers from high-skill rms in order to prevent high-skill workers
from quitting. Since long-term contracts are not possible, the workers realize that once they
decline an oer from a high-skill rm in order to accept the matching oer from their current
employer, their current employer will immediately renegotiate the wage back to its initial
level.
Note also that since long-term wage contracts are not allowed, a worker's only credible
alternative to the current job is quitting into unemployment. Consequently, a worker's threat
point in wage setting is her unemployment value, irrespective of being unemployed or not.
This, in turn, implies that the surplus, and therefore the wage that splits the surplus, is the
same for both employed and unemployed applicants, so that rms are indierent between
the two.
Under the assumption that workers cannot write long-term wage contracts, the wage,
wij(x), satises the typical Nash bargaining solution:
Wij(x)   Uj(x) = Sij(x)
Jij(x)   Vi(x) = (1   )Sij(x): (16)
where Sij(x) is the match surplus, dened as:
Sij(x) = Wij(x) + Jij(x)   Ui(x)   Vj(x) (17)
Using (3)-(16) we can solve for the equilibrium wages;
wll(x) = (yll   bl) + bl + pl(x)Ex0jxJll(x
0) (18)
w hh(x) = (yhh   bh) + bh + ph(x)Ex0jxJ hh(x
0) (19)
whh(x) = (yhh   bh) + bh + pl(x)Ex0jxJhl(x
0) + ph(x)Ex0jxJhh(x
0) (20)





12A worker's wage is such that she gets a share  of the net productivity the job creates, given
by yij   bi(x), plus the value her outside option. The latter is given by unemployment
income, bi, plus the surplus the worker expects to generate from unemployed search. The
skill-mismatched workers need to compensate their employers for their higher probability of
quitting by accepting a wage decrease. This explains why the term (1 sl)ph(x)Ex0jxJhh(x0)
enters negatively in (21).
Comparing (20) with (21) shows that whh(x) > whl(x), both because on-the-job searchers
suer a wage reduction, and because hh > hl, by assumption. It follows that skill-
mismatched workers are better o quitting to go to high-skill jobs, which ensures that
on-the-job search is optimal for these workers. Inspecting the wage equations shows also
that the conditions in (1) are sucient to ensure that wll(x) > bl, whh(x) > bh, w hh(x) > bh
and whl(x) > bh. As noted earlier, these imply that a low-skill worker is better o accepting
a low-skill job, a type- h is better o accepting a high-skill job, and that a type-h worker is
better o accepting either type of job, instead of remaining unemployed.
2.5 Equilibrium
Given free entry, in equilibrium vacancies must yield zero prots: Vh(x) = Vl(x) = 0 and
Vh(x0) = Vl(x0) = 0. Using these zero prot conditions in (14) and (15), gives the free-entry






























With the values in (10) to (13) and the wages in (18) to (21) substituted in, these con-
ditions implicitly dene (x) and (x). More formally, the equilibrium is given by a vec-
tor f;g that for each realization of aggregate state, y, and distribution of employment,
e = fell;elh;ehh;e hhg, the values of opening low- and high-skill vacancies both equal zero.
As in the standard model, when the left-hand sides of these equations are higher than
their right-hand sides, then the expected gains from vacancy postings exceed the expected
vacancy-posting costs, and rms post a higher number of vacancies per job seeker (increase
(x)) until all rents are exhausted.
The equilibrium skill-mix of vacancies, (x), depends on the relative protability of the
13two types of vacancies. Combining the two free-entry condition gives:
chEx0jx [ulJll(x
0) + uhJhl(x
0)] = clEx0jx [(uh + "hl)Jhh(x
0) + u hJ hh(x
0)] (24)
If the left-hand side of (24) is higher than its right-hand side, then the expected prots
from low-skill vacancy postings are higher than those from high-skill vacancy postings. It
can be easily veried from (2) and the value functions in (10)-(13) that the right-hand side
of (24) increases as the share of low-skill vacancies increases, while the impact on the left-
hand side of (24) is in general ambiguous. The impact on the left-hand side is ambiguous,
because an increase in (x) lowers Jll(x), by improving a low-skill worker's outside option
and therefore wage, but raises Jhl(x), by lowering the probability of a quit.10 Because of
the two countervailing eects on the left-hand side of (24), to establish the intuitive notion
that when the expected prots from low-skill vacancy postings increase (decrease) relative
to the expected prots from high-skill vacancy postings, rms must shift the vacancy mix
toward low-skill (high-skill) vacancies to maintain zero prots, requires additional parameter
restrictions.
To establish this intuitive notion, in what follows I assume that the model parameters
are such that:   (1   ) and (yll   bl)  (1   )(yhl   bh) for all y   y. The rst
condition ensures that ul  uh. The second condition ensures that the fall in Jll(x), due to
an increase in (x), dominates the increase in Jhl(x).11 When both of these conditions are
satised the left-hand side of (24) decreases as (x) increases so that a positive productivity
shock that raises the expected prots of both types of vacancies induces rms to open a
higher number of vacancies of both types, but also to shift the vacancy mix toward the
relatively more protable type.
3 Skill mismatch and employment volatility
If the share of low-skill vacancies, (x), is procyclical, meaning that a positive produc-
tivity shock leads to a larger percentage increase in l(x) than in h(x), then the rate at
10An increase in (x) has two opposite eects on Jhl(x). On the one hand, it raises it by reducing the
chance of a quit; on the other hand, it lowers it by improving a high-skill worker's outside option and
therefore wage, whl(x). It can be easily shown that the rst eect dominates so that Jhl(x) increases as (x)
increases.
11Intuitively, these two conditions ensure that a higher portion of the prots that rms expect to generate
from lling low-skill vacancies comes from lling these vacancies with low- instead of high-skill workers.
14which job seekers nd low-skill jobs is more procyclical than the rate at which they nd
high-skill jobs, leading to a more strongly procyclical low-skill employment rate, in line with
the evidence. Therefore, it is worthwhile to discuss the channels by which skill mismatches
can make (x) procyclical.
Setting  = 0 implies that there are no skill mismatches in the model, whereas as 
approaches 1 the probability of skill mismatches increases. In particular, a higher value
of  places a larger weight in the free-entry condition for low-skill vacancies on Jhl(x0),
while leaving the weight on Jll(x0) intact. That is, at a higher value of  low-skill rms
are more likely to become skill mismatched and less likely to remain vacant. In addition,
setting a higher value for  implies a shift in the weights in the free-entry condition for high-
skill vacancies from J hh(x0) to Jhh(x0).12 We can say that (x) is procyclical if a positive
productivity shock has a larger impact in percentage terms on the left-hand side of (22) than
on the left-hand side of (23). That is, the percentage increase in l(x) is larger than the
percentage increase in h(x), if the percentage increase in the expected prots from posting
low-skill vacancies is larger than that from posting high-skill vacancies. Therefore, in what
follows I discuss how the shift in the weights in the free-entry conditions that results from
an increase in  can make the left-hand side of (22) more volatile and the left-hand side of
(23) less volatile.
3.1 On-the-job search and match duration
As shown in the Appendix, the value of matches that are of shorter expected duration
follows the business cycle more closely, i.e., it is more volatile. To understand why, consider a
match that is expected to last, say, for only one period. What matters for the rm's value of
that match is its current productivity. But, if the match is expected to last for several periods,
then its current productivity becomes less important and what matters instead is its average
productivity. Since skill-mismatched workers search on the job, skill-mismatched low-skill
jobs are expected to be of shorter duration than correctly matched low-skill jobs. This lead
us to expect that Jhl(x0) is more volatile than Jll(x0) so that by placing a larger weight on
12Notice that ul is independent of . Moreover, a high-skill worker (of any type) will leave the pool of job
seekers only if she nds a high-skill job. Thus, the total number of high-skill job seekers, uh + "hl + u h, is
also independent of . In particular, an increase in  increases uh + "hl by exactly as much as it decreases
u h.
15Jhl(x0), a higher value of  can make the left-hand side of (22) more volatile. Intuitively,
since low-skill jobs are more likely to be temporary, rms have a greater incentive to create
these jobs in booms.
3.2 Net productivity and separation rate dierentials
The value of a match to the rm is also more sensitive to changes in aggregate produc-
tivity if the worker's productivity is small relative to his unemployment income. If
ij
bi is
small, then a small productivity shock has a larger impact, in percentage terms, on the net
productivity of the match, yij   bi, and thus on the value of the match.13 Hence, Jhl(x0)
can be more volatile than Jll(x0) due to
hl
bh being smaller than
ll
bl , say because bh is much
larger than bl.
Evidently, since the expected duration and the volatility of the net productivity of a
match matter for the volatility of the value of that match, the size of sl relative to the size




bh are also important in determining the cyclical behavior of




bh , and in addition sl > sh, then Jll(x0) is more volatile than
J hh(x0), meaning that even in the absence of skill mismatches, i.e., when  = 0, the expected
prots from posting low-skill vacancies can be more volatile than those from posting high-
skill vacancies. The question that follows is whether these dierentials are large enough to
explain the magnitude of observed dierences in the levels and volatilities of employment
rates of the two skill groups, in the absence of skill mismatches. I address this question in
subsequent sections where I calibrate the model to the U.S. labor market.
3.3 The worker's outside option
The channel by which allowing for skill mismatches can make the expected prots from
posting high-skill vacancies less volatile relates to high-skill workers' outside option. Recall
that the worker's outside option reduces the rm's surplus from having a lled job, because
it increases the worker's wage. It follows that the more cyclical a worker's outside option
is, the more cyclical is her wage, and thus the less cyclical is the payo to the rm from
13To see this, note that by substituting (18) in (10) we obtain: Jll(x) = (1 )[yll bl]+Ex0jx[(1 sl 
pl(x))Jll(x0)]. Similar expressions can also be obtained for the rest of the match types. The volatility of
the net productivity, yij  bi, therefore matters for the volatility of Jij(x). This has also been also pointed
out by Shimer (2005b), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Pries (2008).
16hiring that worker. A high-skill worker that searches for a high-skill job while employed in
a low-skill job earns a wage, whl(x), which uctuates with aggregate productivity, whereas
an unemployed high-skill searcher receives an unemployment income bh that is xed. The
outside option of a type-h worker is therefore more cyclical than that of a type- h worker,
because the former can search for a high-skill job either while unemployed or unemployed,
whereas the latter can search only while unemployed. There is therefore reason to suspect
that whh(x) is more volatile than w hh(x), so that Jhh(x0) is less volatile than J hh(x0).14 If this
is the case, then the shift in the weights in the free-entry condition for high-skill vacancies
that results from an increase in  makes the left-hand-side of (23) less volatile.
3.4 Firm incentives
If booms are associated with an increase in the expected prots from posting low-skill
vacancies relative to those from posting high-skill vacancies, then at higher values for ,
rms have a stronger incentive to shift the vacancy mix toward low-skill vacancies in booms.
When (x) increases Jhl(x) also increases, because the probability of quits declines. Al-
lowing for skill mismatches introduces a positive feedback, therefore, from (x) on the prots
rms expect to generate from posting low-skill vacancies. Allowing for skill mismatches in-
troduces a also a negative feedback from (x) on the expected prots of high-skill vacancies.
An increase in (x) raises the expected gains from high-skill vacancy postings, by worsening
high-skill workers' outside option. But, if a high-skill worker can take transitorily a low-skill
job, the negative impact on the outside option is smaller. In other words, an increase in (x)
has a smaller negative impact on whh(x) than on w hh(x), and therefore a smaller positive
impact on Jhh(x) than on J hh(x). Consequently, the shift in the weights in the free-entry
conditions that results from an increase in  implies a smaller negative feedback from (x)
on the left-hand side of (22) and a smaller positive feedback from (x) on the left-hand side
of (23). This, implies, in turn, that at a higher value of , rms respond to a given increase
14Since the term pl(x)Ex0jxJhl(x0) enters positively in (20), but not in (19), then whh(x) is more cyclical,
but also larger than w hh(x). It is therefore dicult to establish that whh(x) is more volatile than w hh(x).
If Jhl(x0) is small and very cyclical (i.e., if it is volatile), which implies that the dierence in size between
whh(x) and w hh(x) is small, while their dierence in terms of cyclicality is large, then there is more reason to
suspect that whh(x) is more volatile than w hh(x). It follows that this channel is likely to be more important
the smaller that hl
bh is, and the the larger the break up probability of skill mismatches. For the reasons
explained above, both of these factors contribute to making Jhl(x0) more volatile.
17in the expected prots from opening low-skill vacancies relative to the expected prots from
opening high-skill vacancies by a larger increase in (x) in order to maintain zero prots.
4 Quantitative analysis
With two-sided skill heterogeneity and on-the-job search, the distribution of workers
across jobs, e = fell;elh;ehh;e hhg, enters the model as a state variable in a complicated
nonmonotonic way, making it dicult to characterize cyclical dynamics analytically. This
section therefore turns to numerical simulations.
The model parameters are calibrated assuming that the low-skill labor type represents
workers who have at least a high-school diploma but no college degree, and that the high-skill
labor types consist of college graduates. I exclude workers with no high-school diploma from
the low-skill group for two reasons. First, the random matching assumption is better suited
for narrowly dened skill categories.15 Second, all available evidence suggest that under-
employed college graduates are typically in high-school level jobs. I begin the quantitative
analysis with the baseline case calibrated for  = 1, when all unemployed college workers
would take temporarily a high-school job. I then examine how the model's predictions change
when we allow lower values for .
This section examines whether the model-implied employment rates can mimic the cycli-
cal behavior of empirical employment rates and quantitatively assess the role of skill mis-
matches in explaining the observed patterns. It is evident, from Figure 1, that both employ-
ment rates are procyclical, but the high-school employment rate is lower and more volatile
than the college employment rate. The rst averages to 95%, while the second averages to
98%. Moreover, the standard deviation of log-deviations from trend of the former is 2.49
times that of the latter. I examine whether the model can match both the levels and the
relative volatility of the employment rates for these two educational groups (i.e., relative
standard deviation of log-deviations from trend of the high-school to the college employment
rate). I also discuss the model's predictions regarding the cyclical behavior of job-to-job
transitions and proportion of skill-mismatched college workers.
15Ideally the model would be calibrated to narrowly dened skill, instead of educational, categories. How-
ever, such calibration is dicult, if not impossible, due to the diculty associated with measuring skill.
184.1 Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the baseline case ( = 1). I choose
the model period to be one month and set the discount rate to r=0.004. On average, about
27% of the high-school-educated U.S. labor force has a college degree or higher. I therefore
set  = 0:73.16 The choice of values of parameters that are common to both labor types is
not essential for the purpose of this paper. For the workers' bargaining power, the matching
function and the aggregate productivity process I therefore make the standard choices. I set
 = 0:5 and assume a Cobb Douglas functional form, m = Mzav1 a, where a is the elasticity
of matches with respect to unemployment and M is a matching eciency parameter. I set
the elasticity parameter a equal to 0.4, consistent with the Blanchard and Diamond (1989b)
estimate. The matching eciency parameter M = 0:567 is chosen to imply an average value
of  equal to 0.53.17 The vector of states,  y, and transition matrix, , are chosen so that
the logarithm of y approximates an AR(1) process with mean zero. The autocorrelation and
standard deviation of the process are chosen so that the model-generated output per worker
(after aggregating to a quarterly frequency) matches that of the US, which at quarterly
frequency has standard deviation 0.02 and autocorrelation 0.9.18
The remaining parameters are those that dier across the two skill types and thus are
likely to aect the relative responses of employment rates to productivity shocks. These are
the exogenous separation rates, sh and sl, match productivities, hh;ll and hl, unemploy-
ment incomes, bh and bl, and vacancy-posting costs, ch and cl. In what follows I discuss my
choice of values for these parameters.
4.1.1 Separation rates
To compute the monthly separation rate for college jobs I use data from the Job Open-
ings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which reports layo rates by one digit industry.19
The Bureau of Labor Statistic's (BLS) provides tables on the distribution of educational
16The share of college graduates corresponds to the average from 1964 to 2003 using data from the March
CPS Annual Demographic Survey Files.
17The value of  is based on estimates reported in Hall (2005b).
18I use the Bureau of Labor Statistic's (BLS) measure of nonfarm business output per person, from 1948 to
2009. Statistics are based on log-deviations from trend. Following Shimer (2005a) I use a Hodrick-Prescott
lter with smoothing parameter 105.
19JOLTS is available from December 2000 to October 2010. Total separations in JOLTS are divided into
three categories: Layos and Dischargers that include involuntary separations initiated by the employer;
19attainment within each of approximately 700 detailed occupations.20 For each occupation,
information is also provided on the most signicant source of education or training require-
ments. I use these tables to distinguish which occupations are college occupations. I label as
college occupations those whose most signicant source of education is a Bachelor's degree
and whose proportion of workers with a Bachelor's degree or higher exceeds 50%. The BLS
also provides tables on 2008 industry employment by occupation.21 I use these together with
my denition of college occupations to compute an estimate of the fraction of college jobs in
each industry. I multiply this estimate by total employment in each industry to estimate the
number of college jobs in each industry.22 I then compute the separation rate for college jobs
as the average layo rate across industries, weighted by the number of college jobs in each
industry. My computation yields sh = 0:016. Following Hall and Milgrom (2008) I target
an overall separation rate into unemployment of 3 percent, which implies a monthly (exoge-
nous) separation rate for high-school jobs of sl = 0:035. As is common in the literature, my
targeted, overall separation rate takes into account workers who exit the labor force, but
whose behavior is similar to those counted as unemployed.23
4.1.2 Match productivity and unemployment income
I select values for hh;ll;hl;bh and bl to match statistics from the simulated data to
empirical measures of, i) the college employment rate, ii) the high-school employment rate,
iii) the \college-plus" (college education and higher degrees) to high-school wage premium,
Quits that include employees leaving their jobs voluntarily and Other Separations, which report retirements
or transfers to other locations. Since the exogenous separation rate captures transitions into unemployment,
I choose to use Layos and Discharges to compute the exogenous separation rate for college jobs. Evidence
reported in Nagyp al's (2008), indicate that about 80% of quits are followed by a direct transition into a new
job.
20The educational attainment distribution for each of the occupations is based on 2006, 2007 and 2008
data from the American Community Survey data, U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau.
21These tables are provided by the Employment Projections Programme (EEP) of the BLS.
22I use the BLS measure of employment by industry, from December 2000 to October 2010.
23Blanchard and Diamond (1990) show that for the U.S., the \want-a-job" pool for those not in the labor
force is roughly equal that of the unemployed. Moreover, they document that only half of the average ow
into employment comes from unemployment, with the other half coming from people classied as not in the
labor force, signifying that \out of the labor force" job seekers also take part in matching. My targeted
separation rate is consistent with the average separation rate measured in the CPS, when roughly half of
the ows from employment to out of the labor force are job seeking.
20iv) the average job nding rate, and v) the wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly
matched college workers (i.e., those that hold college jobs).
I target the U.S. average employment rate of college graduates and high-school educated
workers, which as mentioned above, average to 0.98 and 0.95, respectively, and a college-plus
to high-school wage premium of 55%.24 I take the overall monthly job nding rate to be
0.4. In line with my targeted, overall separation rate, this value is lower than 0.45 (Shimer,
2005b estimate), which is a commonly used value in the literature, to account for job seekers
who are out of the labor force.25
Turning to the wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly matched college work-
ers, Sicherman (1991) nds that overeducated workers earn more than their coworkers who
are not overeducated, but less than similar workers who are correctly matched. In partic-
ular, he nds that the wage of overeducated workers is on average 5% lower than that of
correctly matched workers. To my knowledge there is no other good empirical counterpart
for the U.S. that can guide my choice of wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly
matched college workers.26 If skill-mismatched college workers earned the counterfactual of
what would have been their wage had they stayed with high-school education only, then the
wage dierence between a college- and a high-school educated worker in the same type of job
should only reect the eect of ability. Empirical evidence show an upward \ability" bias in
OLS estimates of returns to education in the order of 10% to 12%. This suggests a wage gap
between college- and high-school educated workers in high-school jobs of around 10% and be-
tween skill-mismatched and correctly matched college workers of around 40%.27 Considering
24Both the employment rates and the college-plus to high-school premium are computed using data from
the March CPS Annual Demographic Survey Files covering the period 1964-2003. The sample is restricted
to civilian adults between 22 and 65 years old.
25Hall (2005b) takes advantage of the expanded unemployment rate series available from the BLS starting
in 1994, which includes people that are classied as out of the labor force but are likely to move into the
labor force soon, to calculate a job nding rate that accounts for out of the labor force job seekers. By
approximating the expanded unemployment series for earlier years, Hall calculates an average monthly job
nding rate for the period 1948-2004 of about 0.3. This is lower than the value I target. However, my
calibration excludes workers with less than high-school education who typically have a lower job-nding rate
and are more likely be in the group of \out of the labor force" job seekers in the expanded unemployment
rate. I therefore consider an average job nding rate 0.4 as a fair target.
26Chevalier (2003) shows that college overeducation in the U.K. is associated with a wage penalty of
22%-22%. In Germany, Bauer (2002) shows that it is associated with a wage penalty of 10%-15%.
27For evidence on \ability" bias, see, for instance, Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999).
21Sicherman's estimate as a lower bound and this back-of-the envelop calculation as an upper
bound, in my baseline calibration I target an average wage gap between skill-mismatched
and correctly matched college workers of 20%, but I also examine how predictions change
when we allow for a 10% and 30% wage gap.
4.1.3 Vacancy costs
Even though vacancy costs can be treated as scale parameters, they should not be out
of line with the general implications of the model. A signicant part of the cost of lling
a vacancy is the opportunity cost of labor eort devoted to hiring activities. Consequently,
vacancy costs should be compatible with labor earnings. Based on Hamermesh (1993),
recruiting costs should not be higher than two months of labor earnings. Recruiting costs
cannot be too large relative to output, either. The standard upper bound in the literature
is 5% of output devoted in job creation activities. Finally, since hiring is typically done by
supervisors whose wages are at least as high as new hires' wages, recruiting for high-wage jobs
should be more costly than recruiting for low-wage jobs. Setting cl = 0:205 and ch = 0:324
results in 5% of output devoted to vacancy-posting costs and obeys the other two criteria.
Specically,
ch
cl is roughly equal to the relative wage of high- to low-skill jobs (when correctly
matched).
4.2 Quantitative results
With all the parameter values assigned, I use the free entry conditions given by equations
(22) and (23) to nd the state-contingent market tightness (x) and fraction of low-skill
vacancies (x). I then simulate the model as follows. First, I generate a sequence of random
aggregate state realizations; then, starting with the rst realization of aggregate state and
an initial distribution of employment e = fehh;ehl;ellg, I use the ow equations in (2) to
compute the new distribution of employment at the beginning of the next period; then I
repeat. At the end of each period, I record the values of the variables of interest along the
sequence of aggregate state realizations.
4.2.1 Average values
Table 2 summarizes the results from simulations of the baseline model. In all cases con-
sidered, the majority of posted vacancies are high-school vacancies so that pl is substantially
22higher than ph. Moreover, the higher employment rate of college graduates is due to a signif-
icant fraction of them holding high-school jobs. On average, between 10% (when the wage
gap is 30%) to 17% (when the wage gap is 10%) of college employment is in high-school jobs.
Available empirical estimates for the U.S. show that on average 15% of college graduates
have jobs that do not require a college degree.28
Evidence for the U.S., reported in Nagyp al (2008), show that quits followed by a direct
transition into a new job make up around 50% of all separations for college-graduate workers.
Nagyp al (2008) also shows that employment-to-employment ows as a share of employment
for college workers average about 1:8%.29 In the model, job-to-job ows as a share of college
employment average to 0.01 and as share of overall college separations to 0.36-0.37. These are
lower than Nagyp al's estimates. However, this is not puzzling since the model captures only
transitions to higher job levels, while such a distinction is not made in the data. Moreover,
the data in Nagyp al cover only the period 1996-2003, in which the U.S. economy experienced
one expansion. A longer series would cover additional recessions and the severe contraction
at the beginning of the 1980s. Therefore, it would probably yield lower averages.
The hiring rate of rms with low-skill vacancies is higher than that of rms with high-skill
vacancies. It therefore takes longer to ll a high-skill vacancy than to ll a low-skill one. In all
cases considered, the overall hiring rate is such that the average vacancy duration is a bit less
than a month. In the absence of information frictions (i.e., if workers could direct their search
toward only jobs they are suited for), the model implied vacancy duration would be much
shorter. Yet, the predicted vacancy duration is consistent with the data, suggesting that the
existence of information frictions is not an alien feature of the labor market. Blanchard and
Diamond (1989b) nd that for the period 1968-1981 vacancy duration in the U.S. ranges
28Hecker (1992, 1995) measures the proportion of overeducated college graduates using data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) over the period 1967-1990. He labels as \over-educated" college graduates
working in occupations within retail sales; administrative support; service precision production, craft and re-
pair; operator, fabricator and laborer; and farm jobs. He considers jobs in managerial, professional specialty,
sales representative, and many technician occupations as jobs that require a degree. Based on his ndings,
the proportion of college graduates having jobs that do not require a degree in overall college employment
ranges from 10% to 18%, yielding an average over the whole period of 15%. Graduate over-education mea-
sures in the same range can also be found for many European countries. For instance, Green et al. (1999)
nd that just over 20% of graduates in the UK are genuinely over-educated for their jobs.
29Nagyp al (2008) uses panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Dynamics, covering the period
1996-2003 and referring to individuals between 25 and 60 years old.
23from 2 to 4 weeks. Similar estimates can be found in Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger
(2010) for the period 2000-2005. As expected, the model's prediction lies at the upper end
of the empirical estimates, because it excludes vacancies suited for individuals with less than
high-school education. These vacancies have typically shorter durations.
4.2.2 Cyclical properties
The cyclical properties of the key variables are summarized in Tables 3 to 5 that report
cross correlations with output and standard deviations of log-deviations from trend. The
simulation results conrm the insights obtained in Section 3. The proportion of high-school
vacancies is procyclical, meaning that l is more strongly procyclical than h. As can be seen,
in all cases considered, both the standard deviation and the correlation of l with output
are higher than those of h.30 For this reason, pl is both more volatile and more strongly
correlated with output than ph, which explains why ~ "hh is less volatile and less strongly
correlated with output than ~ "l.
The net ow of college graduates into low-skill jobs is countercyclical. Both ows in
and out become larger in a boom, because both ph and pl increase, but eventually outows
become larger than inows, because the number of unemployed college graduates falls. This
explains why output is more negatively correlated with future values of ~ "hl. The negative
correlation between ~ "hl and output peaks at a lead of six to seven months. Both the fact
that ~ "hh is less volatile than ~ "l, and the fact that ~ "hl is countercyclical, make the overall
college employment rate, ~ "h, less volatile than the high-school employment rate ~ "l, in line
with the evidence. As mentioned above, the U.S. high-school employment rate is 2.49 times
more volatile than the U.S. college employment rate. The model is consistent with the
observed relative volatility of employment rates. The ratio of the standard deviation of log-
deviations from trend of the simulated high-school employment rate to that of the simulated
college employment is 2.15, at the 10% wage gap, 2.39, at the 20% wage gap and 2.42 at the
30% wage gap. At a yearly frequency, the corresponding measures are 2.24, 2.50, and 2.56,
respectively, not far from what is empirically observed.31
30By \standard deviation" I always refer to the standard deviation of log-deviations from trend.
31To compute the yearly measures I rst aggregate the simulated series to a yearly frequency. I then use a
Hodrick-Prescott lter with smoothing parameter 100 to compute the log-deviations from trend. The same
smoothing parameter is used to compute the standard deviation of log-deviations from trend of the empirical
employment rates.
24To allow for a more meaningful comparison between the model and the data, I also
simulate the model under the baseline calibration along a series of aggregate productivity
realizations that mimics the U.S. GDP quarterly log deviations from trend for the period
from 1964 to 2003. I then aggregate to a yearly frequency to produce annual employment
rates, and compare them to the empirical employment rates over the same period. The
replication is crude, because I only allow for nine productivity states. Still, as can be seen in
Figure 2, in terms of relative deviations the model performs quite well.32 The magnitude of
the simulated employment rate deviations is clearly smaller than in the data. This caveat of
the model corresponds to the general failure of the matching model to match the empirical
volatility of the vacancy to unemployment ratio.33 The present model performs considerably
better in this dimension, but the model-implied volatility is still about three to four times
smaller than in the data. It should be emphasized, however, that the relative volatility of
employment rates is not sensitive to this caveat of the model. Higher volatility in the vacancy
to unemployment ratio implies a proportionately higher employment volatility for both skill
groups, leaving the relative volatility of the two employment rates almost intact.
Figure 3 traces the behavior of the college unemployment rate and three alternative
measures of skill mismatch, the proportion of college workers holding high-school jobs, the
proportion of employed college graduates that hold high-school jobs and the proportion of
high-school jobs that are occupied by college workers, along the same series of aggregate
productivity realizations. All three measures of skill mismatch are countercyclical and trail
the college unemployment rate. Hence, the model is consistent with the evidence on cyclical
changes in the composition of job quality discussed in the introduction. When the unem-
ployment rate is high, the share of skill-mismatched college workers increases. Expansions
allow skill-mismatched college workers to upgrade to college jobs through job-to-job transi-
tions. The share of high-school jobs that are occupied by college graduates is also higher in
downturns, consisted with evidence by Deveraux (2002, 2004) that the educational levels of
new hires within occupations are higher when the unemployment rate is high.
32I simulate the model under the baseline calibration assumed above, where the wage gap between skill-
mismatched and correctly matched college graduates is 20%. It should be noted, however, that the picture
does not change much when we allow for a 10% and 30% wage gap.
33See, e.g., Shimer (2005b).
254.2.3 Responses to a negative productivity shock
To better illustrate the various eects that lie beneath the cyclical behavior of the
employment rates, this section demonstrates the consequences of a negative productivity
shock. I set a high value for y and simulate the model until the endogenous variables converge
to a stable value. I then set a lower value for y and simulate the eects. This switch
in aggregate productivity results in a reduction in output of approximately one standard
deviation.
The evolution of the variables of interest in response to this shock are depicted in Figure
4.34 The numbers of both types of vacancies and, therefore, the job nding rates, pl and
ph, decline on impact, leading to higher unemployment and thus higher arrival rates of job
seekers to rms in subsequent periods, which encourages rms to post more vacancies. Hence,
the number of vacancies and the job nding rates subsequently partially recover from their
initial decline, but never reach their original level. The initial percentage decline in l is
larger than in h so that  also decreases in impact. The proportion of high-school workers
in the pool of job searchers increases. This shift in the composition of job seekers raises the
eective matching rate of high-school vacancies and lowers that of the college vacancies, but
it is not sucient to induce rms to shift the vacancy mix toward high-school vacancies.
The proportion of high-school vacancies continues to decline in subsequent periods until it
settles to a lower level.
At the onset of the recession the proportion of college workers holding high-school jobs,
~ "hl, declines, reecting the fall in pl, but in about two quarters it reaches its initial level and
continues to rise in subsequent periods, reecting the rise in college unemployment. Both
employment rates gradually decline and converge to lower levels due to the fall in job nding
rates. The evolution of the percentage deviations of the employment rates is depicted in
Figure 5. As shown in the second panel, the overall college employment rate declines less
in percentage terms, and converges faster than the high-school employment rate. The rst
panel shows that this is due to both a smaller percentage decline in ~ "hh than in ~ "l and the
subsequent percentage increase in ~ "hl.
34To derive the responses I use the baseline calibration values. The responses do not change signicantly
when the model is calibrated to a 10% and 30% wage gap.
264.2.4 Inspecting the role of skill mismatch
In this section I examine how the model's predictions change when we allow lower values
for . In Table 6, I report simulation results for  = 1 (as above),  = 0:5 and  = 0, under
the three alternative calibrations. A lower value of  makes h more volatile and l less
volatile, conrming the intuition discussed in Section 3. For this reason, the correlation of 
with output becomes smaller and at  = 0 it even turns negative. Hence, the volatility of ph
and thus of ~ "hh increases, while that of pl and as a consequence of ~ "l falls.35 A lower value
of  implies that a higher number of college workers rely on only the supply of high-school
vacancies to exit unemployment. This, coupled with the fact that as  falls, the volatility of
ph increases, explains why the overall college employment rate becomes excessively volatile
relative to the high-school employment rate, compared to what we observe in the data.
At lower values for , the college employment becomes not only more volatile, but also
smaller than in the data, because the number of college workers in high-school jobs falls.
Matching the data in this case requires either increasing the net productivity of college
jobs, yhh   bh, or lowering the exogenous separation rate for college jobs, sh. For the
reasons explained above, these changes can moderate the volatility and increase the size of
h, and thus improve the model's ability to match both the levels and the relative volatility
of employment rates at lower values for . However, at the same time, these changes will
cause the college-plus to high-school wage premium to rise. With a smaller number of college
workers employed in high-school jobs that oer lower wages, the predicted college-plus to
high-school wage premium is larger than in the data. Setting, in addition, a smaller value
for sh and a larger value for yhh   bh makes the surplus of college jobs even larger, leading
to an even larger wage premium.
Nevertheless, to investigate this possibility I rst simulate the model with  = 0:5 and
the values for sh and sl as calibrated above, searching for the dispersion in net productivity
between high-school and college jobs that matches the observed employment rates. To
simplify things, I consider the best-case scenario for the protability of college jobs. Although
it seems more reasonable to set ch > cl and bh > bl, I keep the values for cl and bl as
35The standard deviations of l and pl decline only moderately, suggesting that the dominant channel
through which skill mismatches aect the volatility of vacancy postings is the bargaining position of college
workers. This is somewhat expected, because the college unemployment rate is much smaller than the high-
school unemployment rate, which means that the presence of college searchers in the high-school sector has
a relatively small impact on incentives to post high-school vacancies.
27calibrated above, and set ch = cl and bh = bl.36 Despite the parameter choices that clearly
favor the posting of college vacancies, I nd that with  = 0:5, the value for ahh must
be about 3 times that for all in order for the supply of college vacancies to be suciently
large to match the college employment rate. This implies an average college-plus to high-
school wage premium of about 180%, which is unrealistic. More fundamentally, with the
required productivity dispersion, the expected prot from posting a college vacancy is much
less volatile than that from posting a high-school vacancy, which makes h excessively less
volatile than l, and as a result, makes the college employment rate much less volatile than
the high-school employment rate. Specically, with the required productivity dispersion the
standard deviation of the latter is more than 6 times that of the former.
I then experiment with an even lower value for sh and a higher one for sl, while setting
ch = cl and bh = bl as above. This helps in matching the dispersion in employment rates
at a smaller productivity gap, and thus a smaller wage premium.37 However, even in this
case the resulting wage premium is unrealistically large. More importantly, increasing the
dispersion between sh and sl, makes the expected prots from posting college vacancies even
less volatile compared to the expected prots from posting high-school vacancies, leading
to an even less volatile college employment rate compared to the high-school employment
rate. For instance, with sh = 0:007 and sl = 0:039, the model matches the employment
rate levels at a wage premium of around 85%, but the standard deviation of the high-school
employment rate is 13 to 16 times that of the college employment rate.
Note the role of the bargaining parameter . If we lower  for college graduates, their
wage declines, meaning that the prots of college jobs increase, leading to a larger supply
of college vacancies, at an empirically reasonable college-plus to high-school wage premium.
However, there are two problems with this remedy. First, there is little empirical background
for such an argument. In fact, it seems more reasonable to assume that the bargaining share
of college graduates, who have more skills and capture only a small share of the labor force,
36I keep the values of the parameters that are common to both labor types as assumed above and choose
a value for ahl that matches the wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly matched college workers.
I simulate the model under the three alternative parameterizations (10%, 20% and 30% wage gap) and nd
similar results.
37Evidently, lowering the dispersion between sl and sh does not help in matching the levels and relative
volatility of employment rates at lower values of . The required productivity dispersion in this case would
be even larger, leading to an even less volatile college employment rate and a much higher wage premium.
28is larger. Second, even if this helps in matching the dispersion in employment rates at a
reasonable wage premium, it does not improve the model's ability to match the relative
volatility of employment rates at lower values for . If we lower  for college graduates,
their wage becomes less cyclical, but also smaller, meaning that the prots of college jobs
become more cyclical, but also larger. As Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue, these
two opposite eects cancel each other out, leaving the volatility of vacancies almost intact.
Consequently, if we assume that college graduates have a lower bargaining share than do
high-school workers, the model can potentially match both the dispersion in employment
rates and the wage premium at lower values for , but the resulting college employment rate
will still be much less volatile relative to the high-school employment rate, because h will
still be much less volatile than l.
To recap, this exercise suggests that the model can match both the levels and the relative
volatility of employment rates only if we allow for a suciently large share of college workers
to transitorily take high-school jobs. This feature makes the college employment rate larger
and less volatile, while keeping the college-plus to high-school wage premium reasonable. On
the one hand, without this feature, matching the observed dispersion in employment rates
yields an unrealistically high college-plus to high-school wage premium and an excessively
stable college employment rate. On the other hand, matching the wage premium yields
a college employment rate that is smaller and much volatile relative to the high-school
employment rate.
5 Concluding remarks
Employment is typically lower and less procyclical at lower skill levels. This paper shows
that a standard search and matching model modied to allow for two-sided skill heterogeneity
and on-the-job search can go a long way in explaining these facts.
The model accounts for the fact that more-skilled workers are qualied for a wider range
of job types and thus have a better outside option than do less-skilled workers. They are less
likely to remain unemployed until their optimal job type comes across, and are more likely
to search for jobs while employed in less-skilled jobs. I show that this feature makes the
posting of vacancies suited for skilled individuals less cyclical, because the impact of cyclical
shocks on the prots rms expect to generate from posting these vacancies is absorbed
29more by the wages of these individuals. This feature also implies greater variability in net
productivity and match duration in the pool of potential hires for rms that seek to ll
less-skilled vacancies, because these vacancies can be occupied by a wider range of worker
types and thus are more likely to be skill mismatched. I show that this makes the posting
of less-skilled vacancies more cyclical, because rms anticipate that these jobs will generate
lower net productivity and be of shorter duration on average. These aspects that arise due
to the presence of heterogeneity in the model have been overlooked in previous analyses
that consider simplied frameworks where there is a unique matching rate for all worker/job
types.
A calibration of the model accurately predicts the observed dierences in the levels and
cyclical volatility of employment rates between college and high-school educated workers.
The model explains the relative volatility of employment rates for the two skill groups,
because it allows for a suciently large number of college graduates to transitorily take
jobs for which they are overeducated. The model accounts for roughly 10% to 17% of college
graduates employed in high-school jobs, in line with available empirical measures. The model
is also consistent with other important features of the labor market such as a procyclical
rate of job-to-job transitions and cyclical changes in job quality with workers occupying jobs
that would be normally occupied by less-skilled individuals in downturns and upgrading to
higher-skill jobs in booms.
An intriguing property of the model is that it explains important dimensions of the data
and provides insights on across-skill, labor-market interactions without introducing complex
features relative to the standard search and matching model. A key element of the model is
that, conditional on the skills they possess, workers can perform only a limited number of
job types, which is a natural consequence of skill heterogeneity in the labor market. Some
other aspects may have important implications for how the employment rates of dierent
skill groups respond to changes in aggregate economic conditions. For instance, dierent
matching technologies or wage setting mechanisms across labor market sectors may also
induce dierential employment responses to business cycle shocks. However, there is little
empirical background for such arguments.
30APPENDIX
Break up probability and match-value volatility
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that the volatility of the value of a
match increases as its break up probability increases. To this end, I consider a simplied
framework were matches break up at an exogenous rate, and the worker's wage is such that
he gets a share  of the prevailing match productivity and a share (1 ) of his opportunity
cost of working. In this simpler form, the value of a match is given by the following recursive
formula:




where the subscript y distinguishes dierent states of aggregate productivity, s is the the
probability of a break up,  is the productivity of the match, b is the worker's opportunity
cost of working, and  is the discount factor. The terms yy0 are transition probabilities
from current state y to future state y0.
In matrix notation the value of a match can be written as:
J = (1   )
h
I + (1   s) + 
2(1   s)
2
2 +   
i
[Y   bI] (26)
where Y is a vector of possible aggregate productivity states, and [Y   bI] is a vector
consisting of the net productivity associated with each state.  is a transition matrix with
elements within each row summing up to unity. All powers of  are again transition matrices.
The elements of a vector with a higher power of  are the weighted averages of the elements
of a vector with a lower power of . For example, the elements of 2 [Y   bI] are the
weighted averages of the elements of [Y   bI]. This means that the elements of vectors
with lower powers are less similar than the elements of vectors with higher powers. Therefore,
we can say that the elements of J are less similar the higher the weight associated with lower
powers of . Note that the weight of lower powers of  is higher the larger s is. Hence,
the elements of J are less similar the higher s is, meaning that the the value of a match
varies more signicantly across dierent realizations of the aggregate state, when the break
up probability of that match is high.
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3435Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values for the U.S. economy
Parameter Value Source
Match elasticity, a 0.4 Blanchard and
Diamond (1989b)
Match eciency parameter, M 0.567 Calibrated
Discount rate, r 0.004 Shimer (2005), consistent
with a quarterly interest
rate of 0.012
A worker's bargaining share,  0.5 Den Haan et al. (2000)
Proportion of high-school workers,  0.73 March CPS Annual
Demographic Survey
Output of a high-school worker in a high-school job, ll 0.210 Calibrated
Output of a college worker in a college job, hh 0.341 Calibrated
Output of a college worker in a high-school job, hl 0.260 Calibrated
Unemployment income of high-school workers, bl 0.110 Calibrated
Unemployment income of college workers, bh 0.230 Calibrated
A college job's exogenous separation rate, sh 0.016 Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey
A high-school job's exogenous separation rate, sl 0.035 Calibrated
Cost of maintaining a high-school vacancy, cl 0.205 Calibrated
Cost of maintaining a college vacancy, ch 0.324 Calibrated
Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the baseline calibration where
 = 1 and the wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly matched college workers is 20%.
36Table 2: Quantitative Results
Description Model U.S. data
30% 20% 10%
Proportion of high-school vacancies,  0.79 0.81 0.85
Probability of nding a:
high-school vacancy, pl 0.38 0.39 0.39
college vacancy, ph 0.10 0.09 0.07
Share of skill-mismatched college graduates,
"hl
"h 0:10 0.12 0.17 0:15
Job-to-job ows/college employment,
ph"hl
"h 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Job-to-job ows/overall college separations,
ph(1 sl)ehl
ehhsh+ehlsl+ph(1 sl)ehl
0.37 0.37 0.36 0.50
Average vacancy duration (in weeks)
high-school 3.39 3.52 3.72
college 6.73 6.18 5.13
overall 3.79 3.83 3.87 2-4
Notes: The table reports results from model simulations for the baseline case ( = 1)
when parameters are such that the wage gap between skill-mismatched and correctly matched
college workers is 30%, 20% and 10%. The last column reports available results for the U.S.
37Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics - 30% Wage Gap
Variable Cross correlation of output(t) with variable(t + i) St. dev.
t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7
m() 0.99 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.50 0.45 0.0464
 0.94 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.0036
pl 0.99 0.88 0.79 0.71 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.0496
ph 0.97 0.81 0.68 0.58 0.49 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.0352
l 0.93 0.70 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.0668
h 0.79 0.51 0.33 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.0555
~ "hh 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.0020
~ "hl -0.49 -0.60 -0.71 -0.80 -0.85 -0.88 -0.89 -0.88 0.0094
~ "h 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.0014
~ "l 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.0035
net ow -0.66 -0.60 -0.55 -0.42 -0.30 -0.20 -0.11 -0.05 0.0932
Relative employment-rate volatility (st. dev. ~ "l/st. dev. ~ "h): 2.42
Notes: The table reports cross correlations with output and the standard deviations of the
key labor market variables for the baseline case ( = 1). The standard deviations are computed
after taking logs and removing a Hodrick-Prescott trend with a smoothing parameter 14440. The
\net ow" refers to the ow of college graduates into high-school jobs, minus the ow out of them.
38Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics - 20% Wage Gap
Variable Cross correlation of output(t) with variable(t + i) St. dev.
t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7
m() 0.99 0.86 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.0459
 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.0044
pl 0.99 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.0500
ph 0.95 0.75 0.62 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.0292
l 0.93 0.70 0.56 0.47 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.0678
h 0.74 0.43 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.0507
~ "hh 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.0017
~ "hl -0.23 -0.37 -0.51 -0.63 -0.72 -0.78 -0.82 -0.83 0.0068
~ "h 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.81 0.74 0.66 0.60 0.54 0.0014
~ "l 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.85 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.58 0.0034
net ow -0.52 -0.56 -0.49 -0.39 -0.30 -0.22 -0.15 -0.10 0.0844
Relative employment-rate volatility (st. dev. ~ "l/st. dev. ~ "h): 2.39
Notes: The table reports cross correlations with output and the standard deviations of the
key labor market variables for the baseline case ( = 1). The standard deviations are computed
after taking logs and removing a Hodrick-Prescott trend with a smoothing parameter 14440. The
\net ow" refers to the ow of college graduates into high-school jobs, minus the ow out of them.
39Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics - 10% Wage Gap
Variable Cross correlation of output(t) with variable(t + i) St. dev.
t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7
m() 0.99 0.83 0.72 0.64 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.40 0.0430
 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.0031
pl 0.99 0.84 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.0457
ph 0.88 0.62 0.48 0.40 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.0289
l 0.93 0.68 0.54 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.0648
h 0.72 0.39 0.22 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.0510
~ "hh 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.76 0:0016
~ "hl -0.07 -0.22 -0.37 -0.51 -0.61 -0.68 -0.73 -0.76 0.0047
~ "h 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.59 0.53 0.0014
~ "l 0.97 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.76 0.69 0.63 0.56 0:0031
net ow -0.45 -0.51 -0.45 -0.37 -0.29 -0.22 -0.16 -0.12 0.0628
Relative employment-rate volatility (st. dev. ~ "l/st. dev. ~ "h): 2.15
Notes: The table reports cross correlations with output and the standard deviations of the
key labor market variables for the baseline case ( = 1). The standard deviations are computed
after taking logs and removing a Hodrick-Prescott trend with a smoothing parameter 14440. The
\net ow" refers to the ow of college graduates into high-school jobs, minus the ow out of them.
40Table 6: The Role of Skill Mismatches
30% 20% 10%
variable  = 1  = 0:5  = 0  = 1  = 0:5  = 0  = 1  = 0:5  = 0
Standard Deviations
~ "hh 0.0020 0.0041 0.0075 0.0017 0.0030 0.0038 0.0016 0.0026 0.0028
~ "hl 0.0094 0.0213 - 0.0068 0.0149 - 0.0047 0.0125 -
~ "h 0.0014 0.0026 0.0075 0.0014 0.0021 0.0038 0.0014 0.0019 0.0028
~ "l 0.0035 0.0029 0.0024 0.0034 0.0031 0.0027 0.0031 0.0030 0.0027
l 0.0668 0.0607 0.0524 0.0678 0.0624 0.0574 0.0648 0.0613 0.0577
h 0.0555 0.0879 0.1349 0.0507 0.0688 0.0810 0.0510 0.0639 0.0661
pl 0.0496 0.0415 0.0341 0.0500 0.0454 0.0410 0.0457 0.0446 0.0423
ph 0.0352 0.0674 0.1151 0.0292 0.0495 0.638 0.0289 0.0447 0.0498
Levels
~ "l 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.92
~ "h 0.98 0.92 0.83 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.89
~ "hl 0.10 0.06 - 0.12 0.05 - 0.16 0.05 -
Cross correlation of  with output
0.94 -0.73 -0.92 0.97 0.30 -0.82 0.95 0.55 -0.36
Relative employment-rate volatility
2.42 1.11 0.32 2.39 1.52 0.72 2.15 1.60 0.97
Notes: The table reports results for dierent values of the proportion of college graduates
that would transitorily take a high-school job, . The standard deviations are computed after




















































































































































































U.S. Employment Rate Deviations 
Real GDP College  High-school
Figure 1: The top gure traces the yearly U.S. employment rates of college and high-school
graduates. The bottom gure traces their log-deviations along with the log-deviations of
the U.S. real GDP. The log-deviations are computed using a Hodrick Prescott lter with
a smoothing parameter 100. The data on employment rates come from the March CPS,
Annual Demographic Survey les. The data on real GDP come from the Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure 2: Simulated and actual log-deviations of the employment rates of college and high-
school workers. The actual log-deviations come from the March CPS, Annual Demographic
Survey, 1964-2003. The simulated log-deviations are along a series of aggregate productiv-
ity realizations that replicates the U.S. GDP deviations over the same period. Both the
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Figure 3: Three alternative measures of skill mismatch along a series of aggregate produc-

















































Figure 5: Percentage employment-rate responses to a negative productivity shock.
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